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It is often assumed that incongruence between individuals’ values and those of their country
is distressing, but the evidence has been mixed. Across 29 countries, the present research
investigated whether well-being is higher if people’s values match with those of people living
in the same country or region. Using representative samples, we find that person-country and
person-region value congruence predict six well-being measures (e.g., emotional well-being,
relationship support; N= 54,673). Crucially, however, value type moderates whether person-
country fit is positively or negatively associated with well-being. People who value self-
direction, stimulation, and hedonism more and live in countries and regions where people on
average share these values report lower well-being. In contrast, people who value achieve-
ment, power, and security more and live in countries and regions where people on average
share these values, report higher well-being. Additionally, we find that people who moder-
ately value stimulation report the highest well-being.
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Scholars have long argued that shared values are importantfor well-being. In theory, shared values bring in a commonframework that increases the subjective sense of connection
to one’s culture and alignment of personal motives with social/
environmental norms1–5. The present paper critically re-
examines this longstanding perspective using international data.
In psychological research, human values are usually defined as
abstract ideals that guide actions and express needs6–8. One of the
most prominent models of human values distinguishes ten value
types: self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, con-
formity, security, power, achievement, hedonism, and stimula-
tion8. Schwartz’s model predicts a circumplex pattern of
correlations between ratings of value importance (Fig. 1), based
on their motivational conflicts and compatibilities, and this pat-
tern has been confirmed in over 80 countries across three decades
of research9. The model has also been supported using a range of
experimental analyses of judgments and behavior, and brain
structure10,11.
The values described in this model can be examined at the level
of individuals and aggregate groups, such as countries, and
congruence between personal and national values has theoretical
implications for personal well-being. Four potential reasons for
this link are environmental affordances, social sanctions, internal
conflict, and shared realities12–17. For example, if an individual’s
society values achievement (e.g., success), and the individual does
as well, then the individual might feel supported by the sense of
common purpose. If the individual does not value achievement,
the individual might feel pressured by social norms to achieve
more. This pressure, in turn, may reduce the individual’s sub-
jective well-being. Further, incongruence between people’s own
and their compatriots’ values can result in internal conflicts,
which may result in reduced well-being. This reduction might
occur because people’s goals are blocked in incongruent envir-
onments. Conversely, goal facilitation may occur in congruent
value environments. Moreover, congruence in values can result in
the experience of shared reality and identity, which in turn helps
to validate one’s experience, facilitates cooperation, coordination,
and promotes a sense of belonging14,18.
Yet, past research has been inconclusive about whether value
congruence (sometimes framed as discrepancy) predicts well-
being12,15,17,19–25. This inconclusiveness may arise because of
several methodological and analytical differences across studies,
which makes it difficult to compare the studies. For example,
studies have conceptualized person–environment value con-
gruence with either an objective or a subjective approach12,22. In
the objective approach, individuals’ self-rated value priorities are
compared with the actual value priorities of others (e.g., family,
fellow students, and society). In the subjective approach, the self-
rated priorities are compared with the individual’s perceptions of
the value priorities of others. In addition, there are differences in
the type of sample used: students or nonstudent samples. Further,
the statistical approaches differ, which may also have a strong
impact on the outcome. Some researchers used difference scores
(e.g., between own and perceived values), while others used
profile correlations as an estimate of congruency. To obtain
profile correlations, the importance a person places on all value
types (e.g., all ten value types of Schwartz’s model; cf. Fig. 1) is
correlated with the country average. This correlation coefficient
that is obtained for each participant is used as an estimate of value
congruence and correlated with their well-being score.
However, both difference scores and profile correlations have
been challenged for multiple reasons. For example, difference
scores have been criticized as “often less reliable than either of
their component measures… [and] inherently ambiguous, given
that they combine measures of conceptually distinct constructs
into a single score”26. In other words, difference scores reduce a
three-dimensional relation between the predictors (e.g., own and
other people’s values) and the outcome (e.g., well-being) to a
ambiguous two-dimensional relation. Profile correlations have
been criticized as “conceptually ambiguous, discard information
essential to testing congruence hypotheses, conceal the source of
the difference between entities…”27. That is, profile correlations
mask differences in similarity effects between value types because
they must be computed across several value types. These issues
greatly limit the strength of conclusions from previous research of
person–environment value congruence.
As a superior alternative to difference scores and profile
correlations, Edwards26,27 suggested using polynomial regres-
sions and response surface analysis. These methods model the
relations between two predictors (e.g., own values and the
values of one’s own country) and an outcome (e.g., well-being)
in a three-dimensional space. This approach enables them to
provide more information than alternative approaches, such as
difference scores and moderated regression28. For example, the
complex interplay between the two predictors can be visually
displayed using response surface analysis. This plot displays a
surface with the estimated outcome of all possible combinations
of the predictors. Such plots allow researchers to easily identify
the location of the similarity effect (e.g., is well-being higher
when both a person and other people same in the country they
are living in value security above average?). This utility is
illustrated by Bleidorn et al.’s29 use of these methods to
investigate person–environment fit in personality traits. Across
860 US-American cities, they found that people had higher self-
esteem if their personality traits aligned with the average traits
of the city in which they lived. However, the effect sizes were
very small and only reliable for some personality traits (e.g.,
openness and agreeableness). Similarly, polynomial regressions
have been used to examine effects of person–environment fit in
traits on indicators of entrepreneurial success30, attachment31,
as well as fit in values on anti-immigrant attitudes32 and
national pride33. These studies have demonstrated the utility of
the polynomial method as a powerful tool for precisely esti-
mating effects of person–environment fit.
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Fig. 1 Model of human values. Schwartz’8 quasi-circumplex model of human
values displaying four higher value types, ten value types (bold font), and
examples of values in each type (normal font; adapted from ref. 75).
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We chose to use the polynomial methodology to disambiguate
the connection between person–country value congruence and
subjective well-being. This method enables an examination of the
role of value congruence independently of the linear effects of
personal values on well-being34,35. This method takes into
account the linear and quadratic effects of a person’s own values,
the linear and quadratic effects of the environment (e.g., country
or region), and the interaction between a person’s values and an
environment’s values (i.e., value congruence). The quadratic
terms, the two linear terms, and the interaction are necessary to
test for similarity effects robustly36. Polynomial regressions allow
us to investigate these effects together, which will enable a more
conclusive overview of the relations between values and well-
being.
To make our application of polynomial methods relevant
across diverse regions and countries, we used data from 28
European countries and Israel. We further expanded previous
research by including six variables related to well-being37: eva-
luative well-being (overall satisfaction with life and happiness),
emotional well-being (positive feelings and lack of negative feel-
ings in the past week), functioning (e.g., self-esteem, optimism,
and feelings of autonomy), vitality (e.g., feeling energized and
quality of sleep), community well-being (feeling close to and
trusting other people, especially in the own community), and
supportive relationships (feeling appreciated and supported by
other people). While most previous studies focused on only one
dependent variable, including several measures of well-being
allows a better understanding of the processes of
person–environment fit. For instance, does fit in values relate
more strongly to personal well-being outcomes (e.g., evaluative
and emotional well-being) or interpersonal well-being outcomes
(e.g., community well-being and supportive relationships)? This
question is difficult to address using prior studies because dif-
ferences in predictors and statistical analyses prevent straight-
forward comparisons of effect sizes. Also, having several well-
being variables allows us to replicate and extend previous
research. For example, we can test whether value fit is associated
with self-esteem in the same manner as person–region trait fit
correlates with self-esteem29.
Of particular theoretical importance, the use of Schwartz’s8
model allows a fine-grained analysis for which types of values
yield effects of person–environment fit on well-being. As outlined
above, it is plausible that person–country fit in all values predicts
well-being, but a crucial issue is whether these relations depend
on value type. Past research examining value congruence and
measures of well-being (e.g., Beilmann and Lilleoja19 have
assessed congruence across values using profile correlations).
Because this method aggregates across all values, it does not
reveal for which value type value congruence matters most, and
whether the effects of congruence vary between different values.
A polynomial regression approach allows us to examine each
value type separately and to avoid the aforementioned statistical
limitations of reliance on profile correlations.
It is conceivable that well-being is supported by
person–country value congruence, regardless of the type of value
being examined, because the environmental affordances and
social sanctions operate similarly for all values. For example,
people whose values deviate from the prevalent values in a society
might be socially sanctioned, regardless of value type. Alter-
natively, Schwartz’s8,38 model predicts that values’ associations
with other variables follow a sinusoidal pattern across values,
such that values that serve opposing motivations in his circum-
plex model will exhibit an opposite pattern of correlations, with
other variables. From this perspective, value congruence at
opposing ends of the value circle may exhibit opposing patterns
of relations with well-being.
As a starting point, we predict that people with high con-
servation values (e.g., security, tradition, and conformity), which
preserve the status quo, would report higher well-being when
these values are shared by others in their country because this will
make their life more stable. Also, people valuing conservation
values identify more with their country39 and prefer to be similar
to people around them40, which likely results in higher well-
being. This prediction is illustrated for security values in Fig. 2,
left panel, which shows significant interaction terms in absence of
linear/quadratic effects: if the security values of a person (x-axis)
and their country (y-axis) are both high, well-being is highest (see
point x= 2, y= 2, and z= 4). In contrast, if people place very low
importance on security, they may feel more constrained in a
country wherein most people cherish these values (point −2|2|−4
in Fig. 2, left panel) and freer if others also do not cherish these
values (point −2|−2|4 in Fig. 2, left panel). Finally, if a person
values security, but others do not, they may feel less safe and
unsettled, resulting in lower well-being (point 2|−2|−4 in Fig. 2,
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Fig. 2 Predicted associations between values and well-being. Predicted pattern of results illustrated for security (positive interaction term (a)) and
stimulation (negative interaction term (b)), with personal (P) and country (C) level values as predictors of well-being. Both graphs display interaction
terms alone in the absence of linear and quadratic effects. Source data are provided as a Source data file.
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left panel). Importantly, the linear and quadratic terms qualify
these results. For instance, quadratic effects would lift or depress
the plane at the 0|0 point, and linear terms would tilt the plane.
However, Schwartz’s model raises the possibility that the effects
of openness values (hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction)
show the opposite pattern of the findings for conservation values.
That is, people who consider hedonism, stimulation, and self-
direction values to be more important may report higher well-
being when others around them consider these values less
important. Indeed, people high in openness values identify less
with their country39 and seek to be distinct40. Thus, it is con-
ceivable that people who value openness prefer if people around
them are less similar to them, which result in higher well-being
(point 2|−2|4 in Fig. 2, right panel) than if people around them
are similar (point 2|2|−4 in Fig. 2, right panel).
Other research questions focused on the linear simple effects of
values. Past research has established reliable positive links
between hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction values and
well-being15,34. These values are also called growth values38 and
promote well-being directly by supporting self-actualization and
growth needs34. Further, on a country-level, individualism, which
entails self-direction and stimulation, is positively associated with
well-being41. We expect to replicate these findings. We made no
predictions regarding quadratic effects. We include a brief dis-
cussion of linear and quadratic effects in our “Results” section to
obtain a more coherent picture of the relations between values
and well-being; the main focus of this paper, however, is on
congruence effects.
Finally, we include tests to enable a deeper understanding of
the role of social/physical proximity in the value congruence
effects. That is, we test whether individual–country or
individual–region fit matters more. This issue is relevant because
people might identify more with the country (UK or Germany)
than the region (e.g., Scotland or Bavaria) in which they live or
vice versa.
We made no prediction regarding self-enhancement and self-
transcendence values due to the complex and diverging literature
related to agentic and communal traits, social comparison, and
self-esteem. For example, on the one hand, one might assume that
people high in competitiveness would thrive in a competitive
environment, while those high in cooperativeness would thrive in
a cooperative environment. These environments would be func-
tional for their goals and the self-enhancement and self-
transcendence values that activate them. On the other hand,
evidence suggests that people socially compare on both agentic
and communal traits42, which may suggest lower well-being when
people seem too similar in relatively agentic and communal
values, particularly if these are important dimensions of com-
parison for social identity43.
We report evidence that value congruence is associated with
well-being. Crucially, however, value type moderates whether
person–country fit is positively or negatively associated with well-
being. People who value self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism
more, and live in countries and regions where people on average
share these values report lower well-being. In contrast, people
who value security more and live in countries and regions where
people on average share these values, report higher well-being.
Results
Individual–country fit. We first examined the interactions
between individual- and country-level values and, if significant at
.001, whether the effects are consistent across well-being type (i.e.,
(non-)significant for the same value type). Table 1 reports the
unstandardized coefficients of the interaction terms. Detailed
results that include the coefficients of the linear terms, quadratic T
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terms, the conditional R-squares, and the response surface coef-
ficients can be found in Supplementary Data 1 (Online Supple-
mental Materials). Table 1 shows that, on most of the six
dimensions of well-being, the interaction term was positive for
security, achievement, and power, and negative for self-direction,
stimulation, and hedonism. In contrast, fit in benevolence mat-
tered least for well-being.
To facilitate the interpretation of the significant interactions
and get a better understanding of the complex relations between
values and well-being, we plotted four exemplary response surface
plots (Fig. 3): two plots for positive interaction coefficients and
two for negative interaction coefficients. All plots simultaneously
display the two linear terms, the interaction term, and the
quadratic terms (see Supplementary Data 1 for the exact
coefficients). Figure 3a shows individual- and country-level
security as predictors of evaluative well-being. Multilevel poly-
nomial regression revealed significant linear effects and a
significant interaction, but no quadratic effects (Supplementary
Data 1). Individual security was tendentially linked with higher
evaluative well-being, B= 0.11, SE= 0.05, p= 0.0154, whereas
country-level security was associated with lower evaluative well-
being, B=−6.66, SE= 1.82, p= 0.0012. The effect of individual-
level security is difficult to spot because of the relatively large
country effect. Of relevance to our hypothesis, the interaction was
significant, B= 0.64, SE= 0.14, p < 0.0001, with well-being higher
at the high matching points. That is, Fig. 3a shows a country-level
effect, a person-level effect, and a similarity effect. The similarity
effect can be mainly seen at the x= 2|y= 2 point, where well-
being is higher than could be expected based on the two linear
term effects. This interpretation is further supported by a simple
slope analysis: The relation between security and evaluative well-
being is absent in countries, in which people value security less on
average than in countries in which people value security more, Bs
=−0.09 vs 0.33. We observed a similar pattern for power
predicting supportive relationships (Fig. 3d).
Figure 3b shows individual- and country-level stimulation
values as predictors and evaluative well-being as the outcome
variable. Both the linear term of individual-level stimulation, B=
1.02, SE= 0.03, p < 0.0001, and the quadratic term, B=−0.14,
SE= 0.02, p < 0.0001, were significant, whereas country-level
stimulation was unrelated to evaluative well-being, B= 8.42, SE
= 4.71, p= 0.0861. Importantly, the interaction was significant, B
=−1.85, SE= 0.17, p < 0.0001. Together, Fig. 3b shows linear
and quadratic person-level effects, and a similarity effect. This
pattern indicates that, as predicted, individuals who value
stimulation report lower well-being when they live in countries
in which people also value stimulation on average. This
interpretation is further supported by simple slope analyses: the
relation between stimulation and evaluative well-being is stronger
in countries, in which stimulation is valued less on average than
in countries in which stimulation is valued more, Bs= 1.37 vs
0.67. We observed a similar pattern for self-direction predicting
supportive relationships (Fig. 3c). Note that matches at high
matching points (2|2) are not associated with lower well-being
compared to (0||0) because of a strong linear effect and the
absence of a quadratic effect. We also found that the pattern of
results was very similar between Eastern and Western European
countries (see Online Supplemental Materials).
Individual–region fit. Next, we tested whether individual–region
fit would replicate the findings of the individual–country fit
analysis reported above, using regions with at least 100 partici-
pants. This replication was obtained (Supplementary Data 2). The
interaction coefficients between individual–region fit correlated
strongly with those for the individual–country fit, r(64)= 0.97, p
< 0.001 (mean difference between interaction terms= 0.06).
Thus, operationalizing social/physical environment as a country
or region does not impact the findings.
Curvilinear relations. In addition, we explored quadratic effects
because no study has studied curvilinear relations between values
and well-being, to the best of our knowledge. Across countries
and regions, we found a reliable (all ps ≤ 0.0004, see Supple-
mentary Data 1 and 2) negative quadratic effect between
individual-level stimulation values and all six well-being dimen-
sions, suggesting that people who value stimulation moderately
report higher well-being than those who endorse stimulation a lot
or not at all. For the other values, we found no consistent pattern,
although the quadratic effects tended to be negative for bene-
volence, universalism, self-direction, and hedonism, and positive
for achievement, power, security, tradition, and conformity. Most
of the quadratic effects for country-level values did not reach
statistical significance.
Discussion
People who do not share a common frame of values with their
society may feel like aliens in their own culture, but the impli-
cations of this person–society value incongruence for personal
well-being have been unclear. The present research used multi-
level polynomial regression to robustly examine the implications
of person–society value congruence for well-being in data from
over 54,000 individuals across 29 nations and 184 regions. The
findings show that the effects of person–country value fit and
person–region value fit depend critically on which values are
examined, and in a consistent manner across dimensions of well-
being.
Congruence in judgments of high importance for self-direc-
tion, stimulation, and hedonism values, relative to congruence in
the midrange, was associated with lower well-being. That is, when
individuals rated these values above average in importance and
lived in countries or regions in which these values were also above
average in importance, they reported lower well-being compared
to people with matches on the average and below-average level. In
contrast, congruence in achievement, power, and security values
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Fig. 3 Actual associations between values and well-being. Four response
surface plots based on the multilevel polynomial regression results with
individual- (P) and country- (C) level values as predictors, including control
variables, for security (a), stimulation (b), self-direction (c), and power (d)
values. Predictors were standardized for illustrative purposes. Source data
are provided as a Source data file.
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was associated with higher well-being than congruence in the
midrange. This pattern was replicated across person–region and
person–country fit and demonstrated high consistency across six
dimensions of well-being.
The findings support our predictions that people who highly
value security experience greater well-being among other people
sharing their values. They also reveal that people who highly
value stimulation experience less well-being among others who
share their values to the same degree. As outlined in the Intro-
duction, a person valuing security and safety may find their need
more satisfied in an environment, in which others share these
values than if they do not. In addition, the opposite pattern for
stimulation broadly supports the motivational opposition pre-
dicted within Schwartz’s model, and it fits observations that
people high in openness values identify less with their country39
and seek to be distinct40. The broader findings relating to other
value types can also potentially be explained by the putative
underlying motivations for the values. According to Schwartz’s
model, self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism are anxiety-free
values, whereas achievement, power, and security anxiety-
avoiding values38. Our findings indicate that adaptation to pre-
valent anxiety-free values is linked to lower well-being, and
adaptation to prevalent avoidance-focused values is linked to
higher well-being.
It is noteworthy, however, that the patterns across dimensions
of well-being were provocative but less consistent for four types of
values: universalism, benevolence, tradition, and conformity.
First, the pattern for other anxiety-free values, universalism, and
benevolence, was less consistent across dimensions of well-being
than the pattern for self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism.
There are several possible explanations for this finding. Uni-
versalism and benevolence are unrelated to national identifica-
tion39 and distinctiveness motivation40, in contrast to the other
three anxiety-free values (hedonism, stimulation, and self-direc-
tion), which might have driven their effects. In addition, the
results might have been restricted by ceiling effects and lower
variance: in our sample, benevolence and universalism were rated
as most important values, and had the smallest standard devia-
tions, consistent with the literature44. One reason for the high
agreement across European countries may be the presence of
children in society. That is, thinking about children and being in
the presence of children has been found to increase adults’ pro-
social values, compared to thinking about adults or being in the
presence of adults45. In other words, children may provide per-
suasive arguments for the importance of self-transcendence
values, such as helpfulness or protecting the environment (e.g.,
helping children or saving the environment for children’s future).
Following this argument, it would be beneficial to examine actual
similarities in values in countries beyond Europe, where children
may have a different societal role and presence. That is, in
countries in which children, and other groups that may provide
similar arguments for benevolence and universalism arguments
(e.g., the elderly and disabled), are less present, might show less
agreement and more variance in the importance of self-
transcendence values, potentially showing stronger evidence of
similarity effects in such values. Considering the importance of
such groups in society, future research may test under which
circumstances, and why value similarity effects occur in bene-
volence and universalism values. Thus, while living in benevolent
egalitarian societies is beneficial to physical and psychological
health, among other things46,47, it may be the case that sharing
the values that promote benevolent and egalitarian aims has
indirect effects or effects that are difficult to detect with current
measurement approaches.
Also, we found consistent congruence effects mainly for values
with a personal focus38: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism,
achievement, power, and partly security. Those values are con-
cerned with the outcome for oneself and are therefore con-
ceptually more closely linked with indicators of personal well-
being.
Second, the lack of consistency across dimensions of well-being
for two avoidance-focused values, tradition, and conformity,
might have arisen because congruence in values that reflect living
in secure surroundings and a safe country (i.e., security) are more
directly relevant to one’s well-being than congruence in obedi-
ence, humbleness, and religiosity (tradition and conformity). For
example, a lack of humbleness and religiosity in society may not
be an as direct threat to one’s well-being as a lack of secure
surroundings. However, congruence in humbleness or religiosity
might be relevant for personal relationships. Indeed, we only find
consistent congruence effects of tradition and conformity on the
well-being variable social relationships.
Interestingly, we found that the effects of individual–region
and individual–country congruence were very similar. An
explanation for this finding is that values were highly similar
across the 29 countries investigated here, ranging between 84 and
94% (ref. 48). This similarity may have contributed to the similar
interaction coefficients between regions and countries. In other
words, there is little variation in values between countries, but
substantial variation within countries49. Nevertheless, these small
mean differences in values between countries are in line with
theoretical predictions and are also reliably correlated with other
variables, such as level of democratization50 and peacefulness of
countries51.
It is also conceivable that the individual–country fit is larger for
people who identify more strongly with their country in general,
and also more strongly with their country than the region in
which they are living. Identification was not measured in this
research, but identification is a relevant moderating factor in
related social psychological processes52,53. In fact, identification is
among a number of variables that may help to understand how
value congruence emerges, as people might be more motivated to
identify value congruence in groups with which they identify
strongly54. Value congruence may also emerge through the same
broad psychological processes that generate person situation
similarity through situation perception, selection, and adaptation
in the service of chronic and acute motivations55.
Finally, a subsidiary aim of our research was to examine cur-
vilinear effects of values on well-being. We found that stimulation
is consistently associated with all six well-being dimensions in a
reversed U-shape. That is, people who value stimulation some-
what also report higher well-being compared to people who value
stimulation a lot or barely. This finding can be explained by the
conceptual overlap of stimulation with sensation seeking. Sensa-
tion seeking can be defined as seeking intense feelings through
risk taking56. Sensation seeking is further associated with a range
of dangerous behaviors, such as high-risk sexual behavior and
aggressive driving57,58. Conversely, too little activation can be
associated with depression59, which supports our finding that the
optimum level of stimulation is not too high and not too low.
This outcome was previously postulated, but not tested by
Schwartz8: “Stimulation values derive from the presumed orga-
nismic need for variety and stimulation in order to maintain an
optimal level of activation.” Our findings support this reasoning,
which implies that extremely high or low levels of stimulation
might be less beneficial.
In summary, there are consistent effects of person–society
value congruence across regions, countries, and clusters of
countries (i.e., Eastern and Western Europe). In line with
Schwartz’s8 influential model of human values, the nature of the
relations crucially depends on which values are examined. People
who highly cherish the anxiety-free values of self-direction,
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stimulation, and hedonism exhibit less well-being in regions and
countries, where people share their values. In contrast, people
who highly cherish the anxiety-avoiding values of achievement,
power, and security exhibit higher well-being if they live in
regions and countries, where people share their values. This dif-
ference between the values shows that we need to rethink theo-
retical assumptions about simple, direct connections between
value congruence and well-being. These connections are more
complex and nuanced than commonly assumed. It not only
matters whether the personal and national or regional values fit,
but also which values fit.
Methods
Participants. The 54,673 participants consisted of representative samples from 28
European countries and Israel (Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United
Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Ukraine, and
Kosovo). The mean age was 48.31 years (SD= 18.59; 29,727 women, 24,929 men,
and 17 who did not provide gender). These participants were obtained from the
sixth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS6), which were collected in 2012 and
2013 (edition 2.3 from 1 Dec 2016). We used this wave instead of the more recent
eighth wave from 2016 and 2017 for two reasons: the ESS6 contained more well-
being-related variables than the ESS8, and the ESS6 included data from 29 rather
than 23 countries (Ns= 54,673 vs 44,387). A sensitivity analysis revealed that the
sample size allowed us to detect effects as small as r= 0.01 at a power of 0.95. The
research was approved by the ERIC Research Ethics Board of the European Social
Survey (https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/ethics.html).
The 29 countries were further divided into 351 regions, such as 12 regions in the
UK (9 English regions, and Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales) or the 16
federal states in Germany (e.g., Bavaria, Saxony, and Berlin). To ensure sufficiently
large sample sizes, we only included respondents from regions with at least 100
participants, leaving 184 regions with 45,282 participants. Israel (n= 2508) and
Cyprus (n= 1116) were treated as one region each (i.e., participants in those two
countries were not split up into regions). The smallest included regions (all ns=
100) were Pardubice (Czech Republic), Pomeranian Voivodeship (Poland), Kiev
Oblast (Ukraine), Pays de la Loire (France), and Bretagne (France).
Measures. Values were measured with the 21-item version of the Portrait Value
Questionnaire60,61. The Portrait Value Questionnaire measures the ten value types
in Schwartz’s8 model. Using a scale from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not like me at
all), participants indicated how similar they were to a fictitious person who
exemplifies one of the ten value types. Examples for items include “S/he thinks it is
important that every person in the world be treated equally. S/he wants justice for
everybody, even for people s/he doesn’t” (universalism) and “It is important to her/
him to be rich. She/he wants to have a lot of money and expensive things” (power).
Prior to performing any analysis, we recoded all 21-items so that higher scores
indicate greater endorsement. Previous research established configural and metric
invariance, suggesting that associations between values can be meaningfully
compared across countries62.
We measured well-being with the six dimensions identified by Jeffrey, Abdallah,
and Quick37. Evaluative well-being was measured with two items that asked how
satisfied and happy participants were (r= 0.71). Emotional well-being was
measured with six items that asked how often participants felt various emotions,
such as depressed (recoded), anxious (recoded), and peaceful (α= 0.82). The 14-
item functioning scale asked whether participants were free to decide how to live
their life, were enthusiastic about what they are doing, or felt like a failure (recoded;
α= 0.85). Thus, functioning is closely related to self-esteem37. Using four items,
the vitality scale asked whether participants had sleep issues (recoded) or had a lot
of energy in the past week (α= 0.69). The five-item community well-being scale
asked participants how close they feel to other people and whether they can trust
them (α= 0.67). This scale contained the three items that Beilmann and Lilleoja19
used to measure social trust. The four-item supportive relationship scale asked
respondents how often they felt lonely in the past week (recoded) or appreciated by
those to whom they are close (α= 0.57). The response scales differed across the
well-being dimensions. Items were standardized before they were averaged to form
the dimensions. The six well-being dimensions were positively correlated with each
other (median r= 0.52). However, the measure is likely not fully invariant across
countries: Charalampi et al.63 analyzed the six-dimensional well-being measure in
17 out of the 29 countries that participated in the sixth round of the European
Social Survey. They found the best statistical fit for a four-factor solution in some
countries, a five-factor solution in other countries, and a six-factor solution in only
two countries. However, we do not expect different results if the items were
combined into different factors, because the six dimensions correlated highly with
each other, on average (median r= 0.52). Further, it is typically difficult to establish
measurement invariance across a larger set of items, factors, and especially
countries. Indeed, Charalampi et al. concluded that “the analysis did produce
reliable and valid summary measures (subscales) of well-being for informing social
policy in each country” (p. 73).
Following Bleidorn et al.29, we T-transformed the six dependent variables
(standard scores with M= 50 and SD= 10), because T-scores can be used as an
effect size where a two-point difference represents a small effect, a five-point
difference a medium effect, and an eight-point difference a large effect.
Data analysis. We used multilevel polynomial regression analysis and response
surface plots26,28,64 to test whether value congruence is associated with well-being.
We controlled for country- or regions-level sample size, following Bleidorn et al.29.
The pattern of results were similar when we controlled for individual-level age and
gender, as well as country-level age: correlations between linear terms of
individual-level values predicting well-being without and with controlling for age
and gender were r(58)= 0.97, and correlations between the interaction terms
without and with controlling for age and gender were r(58)= 0.99 (Supplemen-
tary 3 and 4). Also, controlling for the country-level variable Human Develop-
mental Index (HDI)65, individual-level education, or income resulted in the same
pattern of findings (Supplementary Data 5 and 6). For example, the correlation
between the interaction terms without control variables as reported in Supple-
mentary Data 1, column 9, and the interaction terms of the multilevel polynomial
regressions in which we controlled for individual-level age, gender, education level,
income, country-level age, and the HDI was r(58)= 0.98. A paired-sample t test
comparing the interaction terms was not significant, t(59)= 0.82, p= 0.42, sug-
gesting that the effects we found are robust. However, particularly including the
HDI as a country-level control variable reduced; however, the country-level effects
substantially (Supplementary Data 5). These are less relevant for the presented
research (the reduced country-level effects can be explained by previous research
suggesting strong associations between country-level scores of well-being and other
country-level variables, such as income)41. The finding that HDI does not affect the
congruence effects is echoed by our supplemental analysis, where we found that the
pattern of results was very similar across Eastern and Western European countries
(see Online Supplemental Materials).
Following recommendations, predictors were centered along their respective
mean28,66 before they were multiplied to form the interaction term and squared to
form the quadratic terms. In addition, we verified the occurrence of matches and
mismatches, and that predictors are not multicollinear.
In total, we performed 10 (value types) × 6 (well-being dimensions) × 2 (country
vs region) polynomial regressions to examine the effects of fit. Because of our large
sample size and high number of comparisons, we will only discuss findings that are
significant at α= 0.001. We consider this threshold as neither overly conservative
nor liberal. However, readers might vary in their preferred thresholds, and we
therefore report the exact p values up to four decimal places in the Online
Supplemental Materials. To interpret the results, we focus on the regression weights
separately32. Some researchers argued that to investigate the interaction, as well as
linear and quadratic effects further, one should compute the four response surface
parameters, a1–a4, which allow for a more detailed interpretation of the response
surface plots28,64. For example, the parameter a4 indicates whether well-being is
higher (positive a4) or lower (negative a4) in the presence of large mismatches
between own and regional-level values. Unlike the interaction term (Fig. 2), the
outcome (here: well-being) for all matches is the same, no matter whether a4 is
positive or negative.
For a similarity effect to occur, Humberg et al.64 argued that first the coefficient
a4 needs to be significantly negative. However, we believe this expectation is
problematic because of the way that a4 is computed: it is the sum of both quadratic
terms minus the interaction term26,28. Thus, the quadratic effects are weighted
twice as heavily as the interaction term in the computation of a4, masking
congruence effects at the extreme ends of the predictors, as indicated by the
interaction term. Hence by looking at the interaction term and the quadratic terms
separately, we can obtain more detailed information about any congruence32.
Following Bleidorn et al.29, we did not formally test for congruence. Specifically,
Edwards26,64 argued that, among other things, a strict requirement for congruence
is that the ridge of the plane needs to be exactly above the main diagonal of the
plot, that is between the points (−2|−2|−4) and points (2|2|−4), as it is the case for
both planes displayed in Fig. 2. This requirement is difficult to achieve in the
present research because the variance for the country-level scores is significantly
smaller than for the individual-level value scores. To estimate the amount of
explained variance, we computed the conditional R2GLMM67 with the R-package
MuMIn68 (version 1.42.1), which included fixed and random effects. Multilevel
analyses were conducted with the R-package lme4 (ref. 69; version 1.1-18-1), as well
as response surface analyses with the R-packages RSA70 (version 0.9.12) and
ggplot2 (ref. 71) (version 3.3.0).
Some value researchers recommend to ipsatise (or center) the value scores on
an individual level by subtracting the mean score of each participant from their
value rating8,60. It is argued that ipsatising corrects for individual scale use, and
allows researchers to investigate the relative importance people attribute to each
value rather than the absolute importance. However, we did not ipsatise the value
scores for several reasons. First, He and van de Vijver72 challenged empirically the
claim that ipsatising (“centering”) corrects for scale use: “[s]core corrections to deal
with response styles are not recommended” (p. 129). Second, He et al.73 found that
ipsatisation reduces internal consistency and measurement invariance, which is
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especially important for cross-cultural research (note that Davidov et al.62, cited
above, do not report to have ipsatised the value scores prior to testing for
measurement invariance across countries). Third, we already centered the data on a
variable level as recommended by guidelines for moderated regression analysis66.
Ipsatising and then centring the data would reduce the interpretability of the data.
Fourth, Borg and Bardi74 reported that the mean rating of the value responses of
each person is correlated with well-being. That is, how much participants rated the
importance of on average with all value items correlated positively with well-being.
For example, people who are depressed are less likely to find any value important.
Reproducing the approach of Borg and Bardi in the dataset, we are using yielded
comparable correlations between the mean ratings and the six well-being
dimensions of r= 0.04 (communal well-being) and r= 0.33 (functioning). Thus, if
we were to use the difference between value scores and the mean rating, which is
itself is correlated with well-being, findings would be distorted. Finally, researchers
who work with conceptually related constructs, such as personality traits (e.g., Big
Five) or goals do not ipsatise, which would hamper cross-construct comparisons.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
The data is openly available (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/). A reporting
summary for this article is available as a Supplementary information file.
Code availability
The R-code for the analyses can be found on https://osf.io/u6378.
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